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Why You Should Care About the
Threatened Middle Class
JILL LITTRELL
FRED BROOKS
JAN IVERY
MARY L. OHMER
Georgia State University
In the last two decades, the income and security of the individual
middle class worker has declined and the gap between the middle
class and the wealthy has widened. We explain how this is bad for
democracy, the economy, and the aggregate health of the nation.
We examine the governmental policies and interventions that in-
creased the middle class following the depression and maintained
its vigor through the post-World War II period. The impetus for
these changes in governmental policies in the 1930s was to end
the Great Depression. We pose the question of whether a nation
can recover from a depression without invigorating the middle
class. We conclude that in order to recover from the current eco-
nomic and financial crisis, the middle class must be strengthened.
Key words: middle class, depression, economy, social justice, New
Deal
Since the early 1970s, income distribution in America
has become much less equitable (Kawachi & Kennedy, 2002;
Krugman, 2007; Piketty & Saez, 2003; Reich, 2007). Both the
bottom quintile and the middle quintile of earners have de-
creased in their share of the nation's aggregated earned income.
For the middle class, the proportion of earned income dropped
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from a 1967 figure of 17.3% to a figure of 14.6% in 2005. For the
bottom quintile, the proportion dropped from 4.0% in 1967 to
3.4% in 2005. Who gained? The top quintile rose from 43.8%
in 1967 to 50.4% in 2005. Table 1 presents the trends in tabular
form, where it is clear that the middle quintile shows the steep-
est decline.
Table 1: Distribution (in percentages) of all earned income across
various quintiles: 1967 to 2005
Income 1967 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005Quintiles
Lowest 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.4
Second 10.8 10.8 10.5 10.3 9.7 9.6 9.1 8.9 8.6
Middle 17.3 17.4 17.1 16.9 16.3 15.9 15.2 14.8 14.6
Fourth 24.2 24.5 24.8 24.9 24.6 24.0 23.3 23.0 23.0
Highest 43.8 43.3 43.2 43.7 45.3 46.6 48.7 49.8 50.4
Notes: 2005 average income: $10,655 for lowest quintile, $27,357 for second, $46,301
for middle, $72,825 for fourth, and $159,583 for highest.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2005). Current Population Survey, 1968 to 2006 Annual
Social and Economic Supplements
The reality facing the middle class may be clearer looking
at the average income over time (using adjusted dollars). The
post-World War II period in America was a prosperous time
for the average earner. After World War II, the typical family
income doubled from $22,000 in today's prices to $44,000
(Krugman, 2007, p. 55). While household income has risen
from 1973 to 2007, more households were represented by
two working adults (Palley, 1998, p. 63; Pew Research Center,
2008; Sawhill & Morton, 2007). From 1974 to 2004, for males in
their 30s, individual median income declined by 12% (Sawhill
& Morton, 2007). From 2000 to 2004, the incomes of college
graduates declined by 5% (Krugman, 2006). From 2000 to 2007,
wages for full-time, employed men were stagnant and middle
class household incomes were lower by $300 in 2007 adjusted
dollars (Bernstein, 2008; Pew Research Center, 2008).
While income is a measure of economic prosperity, wealth
from property or stocks can also be examined in order to de-
termine how middle class America is doing. The figures here
mirror the disparities seen in income levels. From the 1970s
to 2007, the nation's richest 1% have more than doubled their
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share of the nation's wealth (Reich, 2007, p. 114). The richest
1% owns 39% of the nation's total assets, including real estate
(Wolff, 1998). The top 1% own 49.5% of all stocks while the top
10% own 83.6% of stocks (Palley, 1998, p. 58). In terms of all
investments (stocks, bonds, trusts, business equity, three quar-
ters of home real estate values) the top 10% owns 90% (Wolff,
1998).
In comparing the United States to other Western countries,
America exhibits a much less equitable distribution of wealth
than other countries (Brandolini & Smeeding, 2007; U.S. Census
Bureau, 2005). This is noted on two indices of income distribu-
tion: the Gini index and the Decile Ratio. (Specific numbers
are presented in Table 2.) Moreover, considering the probabil-
ity of moving out of poverty in any given year, chances are
lower in American than in other Western countries (Kawachi
& Kennedy, 2002, p. 166) and the chances of attaining a higher
economic standing than one's parents is lower in the United
States than in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Canada, Sweden,
Germany, and France (Corak, 2006).
Table 2: Measures of Income Inequality: The U.S.
compared to Selected Industrial Countries
Gini Index Decile Ratio
2004 2000
United States 0.47 5.7
United Kingdom 0.36 4.6
Australia 0.35 4.2
France 0.33 3.4
Germany 0.28 3.4
Sweden 0.25 3.0
Japan 0.25 4.2
Denmark 0.25 2.8
Higher numbers suggest more inequality
Source for Gini Index: United Nations Human Development Report, 2004;
Source for Decile Ratio: Brandolini & Smeeding, 2007, p. 30
Hacker (2006, 2007) has examined the transfer of risk in
the society to the average American over the last two decades.
Hacker calls this transfer "the great American risk shift." The
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unemployment rate is increasing, while household debt has
increased (Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, 2006). The probabil-
ity of experiencing a decline in income level (called economic
instability) increased between 1969 and 2002 for both those
without a college degree and those with college educations
(Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, 2000, p. 117) .In fact, the prob-
ability of experiencing a 50% drop in income was 7% in 1970
and rose to 17% in 2002 (Hacker, 2007). Figure 1 represents this
pattern.
Figure 1. Income Instability Increased at Both High and Low
Educational Levels
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Note:These statistics are detailed in HackerThe Great Risk Shift, supra note 3, at 27-30.The
calculations are based on the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and Cornell University's Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF).
Retirement futures are more insecure as well. In 1980,
83% of firms offered pensions with fixed benefits for life. By
2003, only one third of Americans had guaranteed pensions
and more had 401Ks (Hacker, 2007). 401Ks are, of course, very
risky because their value fluctuates with the stock market.
Ghilarducci (2008) estimates that 50% of retirees will run short
of their financial needs in the future, ending up with less than
70% of their pre-retirement income upon retirement.
90
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Manifestations of a Stressed Middle Class
Between 1970 and 2001, bankruptcies quintupled, mortgage
foreclosures tripled, and car repossessions doubled (Warren &
Tyagi, 2003 p. 78-80). Most people filing for bankruptcy are
middle class: they are well educated, own their own homes,
and have good jobs. Persons with children are more likely to
file for bankruptcy than are households without children. For
90% of those households with children who file for bankruptcy
the reasons fall into three categories: job loss, medical expens-
es, and divorce. Of course, these disasters are more likely today
than in the 1950s and 1960s. Even before the recent financial
meltdown of 2008, involuntary layoffs had increased by 28%
since 1970 (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 82). Displaced workers
are unlikely to find employment at similar pay (Hacker, 2007).
The cost of medical care has escalated. Fewer Americans carry
health insurance. Indeed, one-third of non-elderly adults have
periods during which they have no medical insurance (Hacker,
2007). Financial pressures place a burden on marriages in a
country with an already high divorce rate.
The absence of savings by the American public and the in-
crease in indebtedness of those who are middle class have led
to the common assumption that the middle class is spending
on luxuries they cannot afford. Fortunately, the government
has kept statistics on the spending patterns of American con-
sumers since the 1970s. Contrary to what might be believed,
spending on most categories has declined over the last two
decades. Americans spend 21% less on clothing, 22% less on
food, and 44% less on major appliances than they did in the
early 1970s. What has increased? Health insurance costs have
escalated. With two parents in the workforce, child care is a
new expense, as is the necessity of a second car. (Seventy-five
percent of three- and four-year-olds attended preschool in 2001
compared to just four percent in 1960.) Moreover, the cost of
housing has escalated 26% between 1984 and 2001. Are homes
more luxurious today? In fact, 6 out of 10 of families live in
older homes; however, the size of new homes has increased
by 40% over the last twenty years (Warren & Tyagi, 2003).
According to Warren and Tyagi (2003), the major factor driving
the increase in the cost of housing is the competition to move
into good school districts, although Shiller (2008) argues that
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cheap interest rates also contributed to inflated housing prices.
Comparing houses of similar size and luxury, a five percent
jump in standardized test scores of children in one school dis-
trict versus another adds $4,000 to the cost of the house. School
quality is the single most important factor in determining
the price of a house (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, pp. 15-54). Thus,
contrary to the perception that today's Americans suffer from
some form of impaired impulse control (see Whybrow, 2005),
the long-term goal of raising children who can become pros-
perous adults is driving America's current consumption.
As the housing bubble grew, along with the rush to buy
housing in better school districts, home equity loans and mort-
gages became much easier to obtain. In 1980, Congress passed
the Depository Institutions and Monetary Control Act and then,
in 1982, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act. This
legislation effectively deregulated bank interest rates, allow-
ing higher interest rates from borrowers and permitting higher
interest rates to depositors (lenders) (Mansfield, 2000). In the
past, down-payments of 20% were required when buying a
new home (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, pp. 127-129). In the environ-
ment leading up to the collapse of the housing bubble in 2008,
down payments were sometimes not required at all. All this led
to higher mortgage payments, so the proportion of monthly
earnings going to mortgages increased. A new term has been
created for those devoting in excess of 40% of monthly income
to housing: house poor (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 133). Over
the past twenty years the number of middle class households
that are "house poor" quadrupled, from 2.8% in 1975 to 13.5%
in 2001 (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 231).
Advocates for the poor have sometimes lobbied for easier
access to mortgages, in part by requesting smaller down pay-
ments and even an absence of down payments. Are borrow-
ers being helped by an absence of down payments? Without a
down payment, borrowers are paying higher costs in interest
rates, higher points and fees, and are required to carry manda-
tory credit insurance (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 133). Effectively,
they pay more. Tellingly, the percentage of household dispos-
able income spent on debt service-principally mortgage,
auto loan, and credit card debt had risen from just over 10%
in 1983 to 14.5% in 2006 (Phillips, 2007, p. 99). The median
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debt-to-annual-income ratio for middle-income adults in-
creased from 0.45 in 1983 to 1.19 in 2004. The median debt-to-
asset ratio of middle income adults increased from 0.25 in 1983
to 0.40 in 2004 (Pew Research Center, 2008).
What were banks getting out of deregulation? In the past,
the cap on interest rates meant that banks could not offset in-
creased risk with higher profitability attributable to higher in-
terest rates. Banks were reluctant to provide loans that could
not be repaid. With deregulation, the allure of high profits
(from high interest rates on the loan) lured the banking indus-
try into riskier practices. Before the mass crisis in the banking
industry in the fall of 2008, while loan defaults soared, banking
profits increased even faster (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 129).
Prior to the recent collapse of the housing market, houses were
appreciating in value over time. Financial institutions stood to
realize an even bigger profit if a foreclosure ensued. Foreclosed
properties could be resold at a higher price than the amount
of the foreclosed loan (Engel & McCoy, 2002; Warren & Tyagi,
2003, p. 136). Up until the advent of massive foreclosures and
the collapse of housing prices, banks had everything to gain by
offering big, risky loans.
The shift in how the middle class spends its money has ef-
fectively made life more risky. A higher proportion of income
is going to fixed monthly payments: mortgage, insurance,
daycare, car payments (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 8). Lower
proportions of the pay check are going to categories such as
food, clothing, and movies, areas where there is flexibility (that
is, room to conserve). If a financial disaster occurs (job loss,
divorce, unforeseen health problems), there are limits to how
much families can cut back. Often people fall into the trap of
using their credit cards to make ends meet at the end of the pay
period when the money runs out (Ellis, 1998; Warren & Tyagi,
2003, p. 113). (In the last 20 years, savings declined from 11%
to negative 1 percent. Credit card debt increased from 4% to
12% of income [Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 112].) When families
cannot make the augmenting payments on the credit cards,
they frequently resort to taking out a home equity loan to pay
off the credit card debt (Barr, 2007; Sullivan et al., 2006, p. 251;
Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 131). However, the new loan adds its
own burden of interest payments, so many are forced to file
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for bankruptcy. At the time of bankruptcy filing, the average
family owed 150% of an entire year's income in non-mortgage
debt (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 78).
What changes have occurred making all this debt possible?
Similar to the expansion of credit in the home equity market,
the credit card industry was deregulated and the rules have
changed (Ellis, 1998). In 1978, the Supreme Court (in Marquette
National Bank ofMinneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corporation)
ruled that the laws in the state where the credit card company is
incorporated prevail over the laws in the state where the debtor
resides. Not surprisingly, credit card companies are located in
states (South Dakota and Delaware) that do not have usury
laws. Effectively, usury laws no longer exist. Credit card com-
panies can raise the interest rates on the amount already bor-
rowed when an individual loses a good credit rating, or when
the card company summarily decides to lower the maximum
amount that can be borrowed and the debtor is above the new
limit. When a person fails to pay the minimum payment on a
card, the interest rates (on what is already owed) increase and
penalty fees are added. The principal as well as the interest on
the debt augments. Monthly minimum payment amounts go
up (Fanning & Rummel, 2004).
The real incomes of the middle class have declined over
the last twenty years. Their share of America's wealth has de-
clined. Expenses have escalated. With two adults working, a
second car usually is a necessity. The cost of borrowing money
has increased. With both adults now participating in the work-
force, the insurance policy of being able to add a second bread-
winner should disaster occur has been lost (Warren & Tyagi,
2003). The middle class is far less secure.
Why Is A Strong Middle Class Important?
"When citizens of different countries have been polled
about attitudes toward income inequality, Americans come out
near the bottom in their dislike of wide disparities" (Kawachi
& Kennedy, 2002, p. 25). In fact, only 28% of Americans polled
in a World Values survey responded favorably to policies to
reduce inequalities versus 65% in the United Kingdom and 80%
in Italy (Kawachi & Kennedy, 2002). Kawachi and Kennedy
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(2002) point out that "Strikingly, even the poor in America are
less likely to endorse redistributive or egalitarian sentiments
than low-income citizens elsewhere" (p. 25). Americans seem
to have bought the assumption that income disparity is an in-
evitable outcome of differentials in productivity that accrue
from differences in skills and innate ability (Galbraith, 2008).
They make this assumption oblivious to the fact that during
the last 20 years increases in wages have failed to keep up with
increases in worker productivity (Dew-Becker & Gordon, 2006;
Krugman, 2007; Sawhill & Morton, 2007).
A Strong Middle Class Is Required for a Democracy
Aristotle was perhaps the first to recognize that govern-
ment by the middle class produced the best results. The poor
would be captured by a demagogue who would bring tyranny
for the promise of income redistribution. The rich would be
invested in maintaining their position of privilege. Only the
middle class could govern rationally. Aristotle advocated
policies that would: (a) generate and maintain a prosperous
middle class; (b) provide careers, property, and education for
the poor to absorb them into the middle class; and (c) encour-
age the rich to contribute a portion of their wealth to careers
for the poor and to civic projects for the society as a whole.
Aristotle's motivation to maintain a strong middle class ema-
nated from his belief that only middle class governance could
provide harmony and stability and avert frequent revolutions
and blood letting (Glassman, 1995).
Indeed, Aristotle's fears are mirrored in the current loss
of civility and bipartisanship since the 1950s and 1960s when
more people had attained economic security (Krugman, 2007).
Moreover, using country as the unit of analysis finds that those
countries with high levels of inequality exhibit high levels of
instability of government (Perotti, 1996).
Historical analysis reveals that the emergence of a middle
class brought about a shift from governance by the king to
governance by the people. Barrington Moore's (1966) classic
work on development of modern forms of governments finds
that evolution from a feudal society structure was occasioned
by the emergence of a middle class in cities. As these middle
class individuals grew in numbers, they demanded more
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representation in assemblies and more constitutional rights.
Others have also recognized that during the middle ages,
nascent democratic movements were contingent upon a middle
class whose wealth emanated from commerce (Glassman, 1995,
p. 49, p. 84; North & Thomas, 1973).
While a strong middle class seems to be necessary for a
democracy, there are examples of countries with strong middle
classes where democratic governance is lacking. Singapore
has a large middle class, has business transactions governed
by rule of law and courts, but does not elect its leaders. The
former Soviet Union is another country with an educated
middle class in which leaders were not fairly and democrati-
cally elected (Glassman, 1995). Many recognize that Hitler's
Germany was a case of the middle class choosing fascism over
democracy. Times of uncertainty (either economic recessions
or external military threats) seem to increase the possibility
that the middle class will move toward fascism (Moore, 1966).
We are not claiming that a strong middle class guarantees a de-
mocracy, but rather, that democracy will not develop without
a middle class.
Political scientists Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) suggest
that the presence of a strong middle class is a prerequisite for
stable democracy. In their analysis, Acemoglu and Robinson
take into consideration the costs to the rich of suppressing a
poor majority. They offer detailed calculations to show that
when the majority has few, or limited, resources undergird-
ing its demands, the costs of oppression are reduced for the
rich. However, a strong middle class has confidence, a sense of
entitlement, and resources. (Indeed, all revolutions have been
led by the middle-class [Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005, p. 39].)
Given a strong middle class, it becomes too costly for would-
be oppressors to mount the mechanisms of subjugation. Some
form of broad-based participation in decision making becomes
a more pragmatic solution. Lipset (1981) reaches similar
conclusions.
For the founding Fathers, an equitable distribution of wealth
and property was seen as crucial to sustaining a democratic
republic (Huston, 1998). On visits to Europe, Ben Franklin,
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were shocked by the dis-
parities in wealth they observed between the aristocracy and
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common people (Gates & Collins, 2002). After visiting Ireland
& Scotland, Ben Franklin wrote:
In these countries a small part of the society are
landlords, great Noblemen and Gentlemen, extreamly
(sic) opulent, living in the highest affluence and
magnificence: The bulk of people Tenants, extreamly
(sic) poor, living in the most sordid Wretchedness in
dirty hovels of mud and straw, and cloathed (sic) only
in rags. (Willcox, 1975, p. 7)
Later in this same letter Franklin attributed the enormous
inequality he observed in Europe to the aristocratic form of
government: "And the effect of this kind of Civil Society seems
only to be, the depressing multitudes below the Savage State
that a few may be rais'd (sic) above it" (Willcox, 1975, p. 7).
John Adams agreed with the 171 century political philoso-
pher James Harrington, who believed that power in society
was determined by those who owned property (Adams, 1854).
According to John Adams:
... the balance of power in society, accompanies the
balance of property in land. The only possible way, then,
of preserving the balance of power on the side of equal
liberty and public virtue, is to make the acquisition
of land easy to every member of society; to make a
division of the land into small quantities, so that the
multitude may be possessed of landed estates. If the
multitude is possessed of the balance of real estate, the
multitude will have the balance of power, and in that
case the multitude will take care of the liberty, virtue,
and interest of the multitude, in all acts of government.
(Adams, 1854, pp. 376-377)
In agrarian Colonial America wealth was largely determined
by ownership of land.
Of course, one strong reason for opposing concentrated
wealth is the undue influence afforded to the rich. Woodrow
Wilson stated in 1913 (p. 286), "If there are men in this country
big enough to own the government of the United States, they
are going to own it." Studies of small communities, such as the
classic Middletown study (Lynd & Lynd, 1937), bear out that
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those with more resources can buy advertising and manipulate
what the public hears. Concomitant with the concentration of
wealth in the U.S., we have witnessed the rise of lobbying in
Congress and growing concerns over corruption. Campaign
contributions do buy access to legislators (Stratmann, 2005).
Congressmen who succeed in passing legislation for particular
industries are rewarded, after leaving office, with high salary
jobs as spokespersons for the industries. Financial resources do
influence election results (Repetti, 2001). Reich (2007, p. 166)
argues that super-capitalism (referring to the current state of
America with the rich capturing a greater proportion of ag-
gregate income) has diverted the attention of Congress from
guarding and promoting the interests of citizens to regulat-
ing disputes between corporate interests. In the wars between
the powerful, the interests of citizens have been forgotten. For
example, in 1963, Congress passed six bills out of ten to reduce
economic inequality; again in 1979, it passed four bills out of
seven to that same end; whereas in 1991, it passed only two out
of seven aimed at reducing inequality.
Beyond the threat to good government posed by the con-
centration of wealth is the issue of equality of opportunity.
The founding fathers were concerned with having a society
of equal opportunity. However, Krugman (2007, p. 249) re-
flects, "A society with highly unequal results is, more or less
inevitably, a society with highly unequal opportunity, too."
The wealthy will be better able to invest in the education of
their children. Their children have more time to devote to their
education. A superior education implies that the children of
the wealthy will emerge with better skills. Of course, societal
investment in public schools and libraries could offset some of
the factors militating against equality of opportunity. However,
only through clearly progressive taxing, that is, a further shift
of the tax burden onto the wealthy, with less allowance for in-
genious opting out of taxation, will there be sufficient revenue
to support these institutions.
Inequality is Bad for the Health of Persons at All Levels of Income
The Whitehall studies have shown us that with each
decrease in level of socioeconomic status, various indica-
tors (mortality, morbidity, risk for heart disease) mark a
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deterioration in health (Marmot, 2004; Salpolsky, 2005).
Childhood economic status also affects adult health. Both the
risk of infectious disease and heart disease is higher in persons
whose parents had low incomes when they were growing up,
regardless of adult socioeconomic status (SES) (Cohen, Doyle,
Turner, Alper, & Skoner, 2003; Kivirmiki et al., 2004; Lehman,
Taylor, Kiefe, & Seeman, 2005). The findings of the SES gradi-
ent in health are found in nations with universal health care,
so unequal access is not a likely explanation. Moreover, the
findings hold after controlling for diet, exercise, and smoking
(Lantz et al., 1998; Steptoe & Marmot, 2002, p. 44).
What is most surprising in the health research is the com-
parisons of countries with narrow gaps between the top earners
and the bottom (e.g., Greece and Japan) to countries with wide
disparities (e.g., the United States). At all levels of income, the
health status of persons from the more egalitarian countries is
better (Babones, 2008; Marmot, 2004, p. 65; Wilkinson, 2005,
pp. 100-143). According to Wilkinson (1992, p. 49) the degree
of income inequality in a society explains about three quar-
ters of the variation in life expectancy across countries; per
capita Gross National Product explains about 10% of the vari-
ance. Studies in which states are the unit of an analysis have
produced similar findings (Kaplan, Pamuk, Lynch, Cohen, &
Balfour, 1996; Kennedy, Kawachi, & Prothrow-Stith, 1996) as
has a study in which the unit of analysis was U.S. metropoli-
tan areas (Lynch et al., 1998). However, at the neighborhood
level, poor individuals usually enjoy better health in a mixed
income neighborhood than in neighborhoods with concen-
trated poverty (Stafford & Marmot, 2003). Also, the associa-
tion between regional income inequality and life expectancy
does not hold up in Canada, where across provinces there is
not much variation in income distribution (Ross & Wolfson,
1999).
Researchers have yet to identify the mechanisms through
which large income disparities impact the health of all persons
in the society. However, particular variables such as social
capital (measuring whether people view others as trustworthy
and participate in voluntary organizations) have been shown
to impact health (Kawachi & Kennedy, 2002). Comparing
countries with narrower gaps between the top earners and the
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bottom finds that the citizens of countries with narrower gaps
are more trusting of others and report higher levels of satisfac-
tion (Ellison, 1999; Kawachi & Kennedy, 2002, pp. 102, 110).
Essentially, social cohesion is more likely to develop among in-
dividuals who are of similar social status. Perhaps the greater
social cohesion affords health benefits for everyone.
A Strong Middle Class is Required for a Market
Economy with High Productivity and Growth
A large middle class is vital to a capitalist economy because
the middle class spends on consumer goods. The middle class
is the market. Economists have long known that middle class
individuals spend proportionately more of their income (have
a marginal propensity to consume), whereas wealthy individ-
uals have a marginal propensity to save (Mankiw, 2003, p. 54).
Henry Ford recognized this fundamental truth when he raised
the wages of the workers so that they could afford to buy the
automobiles they were mass producing. Presently, between 62-
70 % of current Gross Domestic Product (defined as the money
that changes hands in America) is constituted of consumer
spending (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2006, p. 283; Mankiw, 2003,
p. 27). Without the expectation of selling the goods that get
produced, no one will build a factory or employ workers. If
consumer spending declines, there is no incentive to invest in
new companies and industries. Job creation stagnates.
The emphasis on consumer demand as the impetus for eco-
nomic growth is referred to as "demand led growth theory."
"Supply side" theory emphasizes investment's role in eco-
nomic growth. It is true that there must be some money to
invest. To generate investment dollars, some of the difference
between the selling price of a product and the cost of produc-
tion must go into investment (as opposed to workers' wages).
Those individuals in the society with the highest marginal pro-
pensity to save (the wealthy) must be left with some after-tax
dollars to invest. But, will those with excess money use their
savings to increase factory resources and/or open new busi-
nesses and create new jobs, without an expectation that a suffi-
cient number of consumers will be able to buy their products?
During the Reagan years in the 1980s, when there was
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much deregulation of financial institutions, we witnessed al-
ternatives for the use of investment dollars beyond creating
new companies and new jobs. In the era of "hostile takeovers
and leveraged buyouts," persons with money to invest bought
up companies, closed sectors of the company where union-
ized workers had negotiated high-wage contracts, and effec-
tively eliminated many jobs (Uchitelle, 2007). Profits can be
used to invest in overseas production, as well as being used to
buy up company stocks to raise stock values (Madrick, 2007).
Managers of hedge funds specialize in making money through
speculation. The realization that companies can use profits in
other ways, besides buying new equipment that could enhance
production and employ more people, may explain a recent
paradox. Between 2001 and 2006, profits had risen to approxi-
mately 15% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but capital in-
vestment fell as a share of GDP by 2 percentage points from the
high in 1999 (Madrick, 2007, p. 3). Until the recent downturn,
the availability of funds for investment was not a problem. Ira
Glass (2008) reports that since 2002, investment funds have
doubled. The frenzy to invest prompted the sub-prime housing
loans which ended in the recent banking crisis.
So when will investment dollars be used to create new
companies? Adam Smith, who recognized that when goods
(e.g., pins) are mass produced, unit prices decline owing to an
economy of scale, also cautioned, "the benefits of such enhanced
potential productivity are only realized if the market is large
enough to absorb the new supply of pins" (Smith, 1776/1936). It
is well to remember that when the causes of devastating African
diseases are discovered, drug companies are not goaded into
finding a cure, because there is no market (Sattaur, 1990). Drug
companies fail to develop drugs for malaria, which infects the
third world, because without consumers who can pay, there is
no incentive (Thurow, 2003, p. 179). James Watt, an investor in
the mass production of the steam engine, is quoted as saying,
"it is not worth my while to manufacture in three countries
only; but I can find it very worthwhile to make it for the whole
world" (Mokyr, 1992, p. 245). Moreover, economists have
credited the growth of the American economy to America's
enormous, continent-wide population (Madrick, 2007, p. 12),
whereas others credit the industrial revolution to the market
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expansion occasioned by world trade (Cameron & Neal, 2003).
Rather than technological innovations leading to growth in the
world economy, Madrick (2002, pp. 2-12) concludes that an in-
crease in world markets stimulated the growth in the world
economy of modem times.
If demand is required for investment and high wages in-
crease demand, then localities with higher wages should
realize more economic growth. Researchers have examined
how increases in worker wages covary with economic growth.
Naastepad and Strom (2006-2007) analyzed data for eight
economies (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain,
Britain, and the U.S.) for two periods: 1960-1980 and 1980-
2001. They found that when wages were high, there was less
unemployment and a greater rise in GDP. Alternatively, when
wages declined, although corporate profits increased, these
periods were associated with greater unemployment and with
less growth in a country's GDP.
There are also data on the relationship between the level
of income inequality (which will increase with lower wages)
and economic growth. Comparisons of countries differing on
the degree of equality of income distribution have concluded
that there is an inverse correlation between inequality and
economic growth (Aghion, Caroli, & Garcia-Pefialosa, 1999;
Alesina & Rodrick, 1994; Persson, & Tabellini, 1994), although
Persson and Tabellini (1994) found that the inverse relationship
between high inequality and economic growth was limited to
democracies. Furthermore, in the Persson and Tabellini data,
a larger middle class was associated with greater investment
within a country. Similarly, Repetti (2001) reviewed studies in
which economic units were observed over a 25 year period.
Repetti concluded that concentration of wealth is associated
with less economic growth over the long run, while the corre-
lation is less clear over shorter time intervals (Repetti, 2001).
The Case for Progressive Taxation
Mechanisms are available for ensuring a healthy middle
class: higher wages and progressive income taxation. Those
who emphasize the supply side of economic growth object
to increasing wages and increasing taxes on the wealthy. If
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business people have their profits taxed at, for example, 91%
(the level during the 1950s) rather than at 35% (the current
level), it is argued that they will be less inclined to make invest-
ments with their accumulated profits (Krugman, 2007, p. 47).
Without new companies and expanded capacity of production,
then economies of scale and increased productivity (amount
produced by worker and machine) will not be achieved. The
data, however, suggest that such fears are groundless.
Data are available allowing examination of the relationship
between high taxes and economic growth. During the period in
this country when we had the highest taxes on the rich and the
top 1% of the economic hierarchy controlled less of the nation's
wealth, viz. 1950-1972, we witnessed better economic growth
than in other times. The Multifactor productivity for the years
1929-1996 were as follows: 1928-1950, 1.90%; 1950-1964, 2.35%;
1964-1972, 2.07%; 1972-1979, 1.12%; 1979-1988, 0.90%; 1988-
1996, 0.67% (Gordon, 1999).
Others have compared countries to determine how taxa-
tion relates to a country's level of economic growth. Using
country as the unit of analysis, several researchers have found
that high tax rates are associated with more, rather than less,
economic growth (Lindert, 2004; Perotti, 1996; Slemrod, Gale,
& Easterly, 1995), although these authors recognize that the
many confounds of level of taxation with other variables (e.g.,
the amount of GDP in a country which emanates from agri-
cultural production) make it difficult to draw firm conclusions
about causation (Slemrod et al., 1995). However, examining
their data, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) conclude that Wagner's
law is essentially correct. Wagner's law states that government
taxes and government spending will increase with increasing
wealth of the country.
There are a couple of arguments to be made about the fair-
ness of a progressive tax system. One such argument is called
Engel's law (about.com: Economics, 2009), named after the
statistician Ernst Engel. Engel's law states that as a consumer's
income increases, the proportion of income spent on food de-
clines. More generally, people with low incomes are forced to
spend the bulk of their income on essentials just to survive.
For the poor, any tax is likely to be a tax on essentials. For
the wealthy, the taxes are on discretionary income. There is a
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related economics law, the law of marginal utility, which holds
that the more one has of a given commodity, the less the owner
values any single unit of it (Cameron & Neal, 2003, p. 15). Thus,
if fairness means equal discomfort for all under taxation, you
would want to take larger amounts of money from the person
who possesses more of it.
Finally, it might be well to remember that those who have
accumulated wealth in this country have not achieved their
wealth exclusively on their own. Government-sponsored re-
search at universities, which fill our academic journals and
end up undergirding everything from pharmaceutical patents
to new forms of plastic, are often implicated in new develop-
ments in the marketplace. There is also our precious heritage
of an open society, where news travels with lightning speed,
and promotes the expeditious interchanges that characterize
our financial marketplace. More generally, our American insti-
tutions (including the financial markets themselves, the edu-
cational system, our physical infrastructure, civil courts, the
patent office, etc.) enable the accumulation of wealth. Thus, the
society as a whole has a claim on the return on its investment
(Gates & Collins, 2002, pp. 110-135).
Should We be Particularly Worried Now by the Insecure Middle
Class?
Economists have argued that the cause of the Great
Depression was insufficient consumer demand (Krugman,
1997). Thurow (2003, p. 72) recognizes that the rest of the
world relies on America to create demand, that is, to be the big
market of spending consumers. Presently, world production
capacity exceeds expected consumption by at least one third in
almost every industry, suggesting that a deficit in demand is
a world problem (Thurow, 2003, p. 248). Palley's book, Plenty
of Nothing, was written in 1998, prior to the 2008 collapse of
the housing market and the country's financial sector. Palley
offered four reasons why the present diminution in middle
class wages makes us vulnerable to a depression again:
1. As the disproportionately large cohort of baby
boomers ages, the bulk of the population wil be
older. It is established that older people spend
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less than younger people. Thus, the aging of the
population will contribute to the decline in demand.
2. In the manufacturing sector, the practice of paying
over-time hours (as opposed to hiring additional
workers) has increased. During a recession, these
hours will be easy to cut.
3. The economy has fewer automatic stabilizers than in
the past. For example, rather than increasing wages,
workers have been compensated with bonuses
tied to company profits. When profits decrease in a
recession, compensation to workers also decreases.
4. Over the past several decades, Americans have
maintained their standard of living by offsetting
declining wages with increased borrowing and debt.
Given present levels of indebtedness, another economic
downturn with job losses will make it impossible to borrow
further. Rather, more Americans will default on loans and go
into bankruptcy. The picture is one of a contractionary spiral,
"with wage deflation feeding collapse in spending, and col-
lapsing spending feeding further wage deflation" (Palley, 1998,
p. 204). Palley's concerns seem particularly cogent now, as we
consider falling prices, job layoffs, and falling retail consump-
tion in the last year.
How Stimulating Recovery from the Great Depression
Inadvertently Created the Middle Class
We have thus far argued that a strong middle class is re-
quired for maintaining democracy, the health of all citizens,
and a vibrant economy. We have argued that in the past 20
years, the vitality of the middle class has been vitiated. But,
what created the large middle class which remained robust
through the 1950 and 1960s? While there was a modest middle
class in America prior to the Great Depression, the middle
class gained in strength and numbers following the New Deal
and World War II. Goldin and Margo (1992) report that wage
inequality began to decrease with the passage of the First
New Deal legislation in 1933, but the "Great Compression"
continued throughout the 1940s. Economists believe that the
"Great Compression" was effectively created by governmental
policies: high marginal rates of taxation, the wage and price
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controls in effect during World War II, and then policies bol-
stering labor extant during the 1950s (Krugman, 2007; Levy
& Temlin, 2007; Murolo & Chitty, 2001; Piven, 2006). These
policies were critical components of Roosevelt's "New Deal."
Another component of the New Deal, the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), was created in 1934. It provided
mortgages to middle class Americans and was followed by
more loans for returning veterans through the Veterans
Administration. The GI Bill educated the masses and created a
more productive workforce. All of these policies increased the
size and vibrancy of the middle class.
The New Deal was intended to bring recovery from the
Great Depression of the 1930s. In fact, the early years of the
New Deal did initiate some marginal recovery from stagna-
tion of the Great Depression. Some believe that the New Deal
might have brought the nation out of depression; indeed, by
August of 1937, unemployment had dropped from a high
of 24.9% to 12.3% and production was up to 1929 levels
(McElvaine, 1993, p. 297; Shlaes, 2007, p. 267; Smiley, 2002, p.
106). However, in 1937, when taxes were increased in the form
of payroll deductions for the newly initiated Social Security
System, Roosevelt cut back on governmental spending, and
money supply through the Federal Reserve was cut, a second
recession occurred (Borosage & Lotke, 2009; Kuttner, 2009;
McElvaine, 1993, p. 297). (The next big government stimulus
package, World War II, effectively ended unemployment in
America.) While the New Deal was initiated to bring an end
to unemployment (i.e., end the depression), concomitantly, it
also initiated the Great Compression, the narrowing of the gap
between the rich and the poor. Could Roosevelt have ended
unemployment and ended price deflation without increasing
the size and security of the middle class? We do not have a
case-study addressing the issue of whether economic recovery
is possible without strengthening the economic security of the
bulk of Americans.
In responding to the 2008 financial system debacle and re-
cession, the Bush Administration was ready to infuse money
into the banking system in order to ensure that American busi-
nesses could secure loans to keep their businesses running.
While everyone agrees the liquidity is vital, some members of
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Congress were unwilling to ensure good wages for workers
in the failing auto-industry or to intervene to prevent foreclo-
sures on those who could not make their mortgage payments.
Defining recovery from economic depression as restoring price
stability and restoring full employment of the factors of pro-
duction, we suggest that recovery from an economic depres-
sion may not be possible without an increase in the economic
security of the bulk of the population.
The housing market offers a case in point. Rationales for
renegotiating loans to prevent foreclosures extend beyond
compassion for the distressed. With the rash of foreclosures,
vacant houses have offered a haven for drug dealers and
criminals, increasing the cost of law enforcement (Mummolo
& Brubaker, 2008). Additionally, given a glut of houses on the
market, property values have collapsed, with prices falling by
six percent during 2007 (Barr, 2008). Since more foreclosures
are anticipated, shoppers for new homes will not buy because
they are waiting for prices to fall to their lowest possible level.
Consumer demand, necessary for stabilizing the price of
homes, is lacking.
Similar problems in the housing market occurred during
the Great Depression. The newly created FHA purchased
troubled mortgages from banks. The owner was then asked to
repay the outstanding amount on the then current value of the
home, rather than the amount of the original loan (Barr, 2008;
Mansfield, 2000; Seidman & Jakabovics, 2008). Identifying
which particular policies re-stabilized the housing market after
the depression is difficult; many governmental initiatives were
occurring under the New Deal. However, in line with our ar-
guments about why a middle class is required for an economy,
we proffer the hypothesis that bringing an end to the current
world recession/depression and stabilizing markets will
require bolstering the middle class. Interventions to save cor-
porations will not work unless workers' wages are also saved.
Conclusions
Presently we are confronting another worldwide depres-
sion as we did in the 1930s (Meyerson, 2009). In 1930, the gov-
ernment instituted the New Deal to bring the country out of the
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Great Depression. The New Deal policies initiated the "Great
Compression," widening the middle class and narrowing the
gap between the rich and the poor. Presently, the government is
going to intervene to improve the economy. In sculpting inter-
ventions to end the current depression/recession, the govern-
ment should look to the example of the New Deal and realize
that interventions must revitalize the middle class. Recovery
from depression may not be possible without strengthening
the middle class. Certainly, a prosperous, harmonious, healthy
society is not possible without a vibrant middle class. If the
middle class is insecure, the outcomes of everyone are com-
promised. In this time of innovation, hopefully we will get it
right.
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